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How WTO Dispute Settlement Succumbed to the Trump Administration 
Steve Charnovitz1 
The December 10 termination2 of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
by the U.S. government is an unprecedented event in international economic law and US 
diplomatic history.  The US government has refused to join some international courts that it 
had a major had in creating, such as the International Criminal Court and the Permanent Court 
of International Justice.  But until now, the United States has never sought to and successfully 
destroyed an international tribunal from within.  Thus, the shuttering of the Appellate Body has 
to be considered a major success of the Trump Administration's nihilistic approach to US 
participation in global economic governance.  Without an Appellate Body to process appeals, a 
government losing a WTO panel decision can now appeal the ruling in order to prevent it from 
going into force.  
Over the past 25 years, my scholarship has often discussed the Appellate Body— in particular, 
its institutional features, its jurisprudence, and its judges.3  Most of those writings were 
1Prof. Charnovitz teaches at GWU Law School. 
2As of 12 December 2019, the Appellate Body has one remaining judge who cannot undertake any official duties 
because a judicial quorum does not exist.  The WTO has recently cut its budget for the Appellate Body so that the 
funding will dry up early in 2020.  For some appeals now in Appellate chambers, there are rumors that those 
decisions will be handed down in the next several weeks. In my view, the legitimacy of those holdover benches is 
questionable. 
3For example, among my writings, see "New WTO Adjudication and its Implications for the
Environment," International Environment Reporter, 18 Sept. 1996; "The WTO's Alcoholic 
Beverages Decision," Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 1997; "The 
World Trade Organization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety," International Trade Reporter, 15 Oct. 
1997; "Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement," International Lawyer, Fall 1998; 
"World Trade Organization Turtle Decision Makes Progress," Journal of International Wildlife Law 
and Policy, 1998; "Improving the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards," in Trade, 
Environment and the Millennium (United Nations University Press, 1999); "The Supervision of Health
and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules,"  Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Summer 2000; 
"The Greening of the WTO" (co-author Michael Weinstein), Foreign Affairs, November-December 2001; 
"Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization" in International Organizations and 
International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects (Transnational Publishers, 2002); "The Law of 
Environmental PPMs in the World Trade Organization," Yale Journal of International Law, Winter 2002; 
"The Review of Health Standards in the WTO: A Comment," The Role of the Judge in International 
Trade Regulation (University of Michigan Press, 2003); "The Appellate Body's GSP Decision," World 
Trade Review, July 2004; "The World Trade Organization in 2020," Journal of International Law & 
International Relations, Spring 2005; Steve Charnovitz, Debra P. Steger and Peter Van den Bossche 
(eds), Law in the Service of Human Dignity; Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano (CUP, 2005); 
"The WTO's Environmental Progress," Journal of International Environmental Law, September 2007; 
"Mapping the Law of WTO Accession," in WTO at Ten: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing 
Countries (Juris Publishing, 2008); "The Enforcement of WTO Judgments," Yale Journal of International 
Law, Summer 2009; "Reviewing Carbon Charges and Free Allowances under Environmental Law and 
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published in academic books and journals and are available in their original forms and 
sometimes online.  But I recent years, I have had a lot of my writings published on the 
International Economic Law and Policy Blog, an excellent online forum created by Simon Lester.  
I have chosen that Blog because it is followed by the WTO community in Geneva and because 
Blogging provides for immediate publication.  Far too often, the lengthy publication times in the 
academic press mean that by the time policy-relevant scholarship is published, it is already out 
of date and the opportunity to influence those policies has been missed.   
 
Principles," ILSA Journal of International &  Comparative Law, Winter 2010; "A Post-Montesquieu 
Analysis of the WTO," in Governing the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
"The Structure and Function of the World Trade Organization (with John H. Jackson)" in The Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Trade Policy, (Ashgate, 2012); "US - Tyres: Upholding a WTO 
Accession Contract -- Imposing Pain for Little Gain," World Trade Review, April 2013; "Green Subsidies 
and the WTO", Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2014/93 
For example, see "New WTO Adjudication and its Implications for the Environment," International 
Environment Reporter, 18 Sept. 1996; "The WTO's Alcoholic Beverages Decision," Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law, 1997; "The World Trade Organization, Meat Hormones, 
and Food Safety," International Trade Reporter, 15 Oct. 1997; "Environment and Health Under WTO 
Dispute Settlement," International Lawyer, Fall 1998; "World Trade Organization Turtle Decision 
Makes Progress," Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, 1998; "Improving the Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards," in Trade, Environment and the Millennium (United 
Nations University Press, 1999; "The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade 
Rules,"  Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Summer 2000; "The Greening of the WTO," (co-author 
Michael Weinstein) Foreign Affairs, November-December 2001; "Judicial Independence in the World 
Trade Organization" in International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and 
Prospects (Transnational Publishers, 2002); "The Law of Environmental PPMs in the World Trade 
Organization," Yale Journal of International Law, Winter 2002; "The Review of Health Standards in the 
WTO: A Comment," The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation (University of Michigan 
Press, 2003); "The Appellate Body's GSP Decision," World Trade Review, July 2004; "The World Trade 
Organization in 2020," Journal of International Law & International Relations, Spring 2005; Steve 
Charnovitz, Debra P. Steger and Peter Van den Bossche (eds), Law in the Service of Human Dignity; 
Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano (CUP, 2005); "The WTO's Environmental Progress," Journal 
of International Environmental Law, September 2007; "Mapping the Law of WTO Accession," in WTO 
at Ten: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries (Juris Publishing, 2008); "The 
Enforcement of WTO Judgments," Yale Journal of International Law, Summer 2009; "Reviewing Carbon 
Charges and Free Allowances under Environmental Law and Principles," ILSA Journal of 
International And Comparative Law, Winter 2010; "A Post-Montesquieu Analysis of the WTO," 
in Governing the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2011); "The Structure and 
Function of the World Trade Organization (with John H. Jackson)" in The Ashgate Research Companion 
to International Trade Policy (Ashgate, 2012); "US - Tyres: Upholding a WTO Accession Contract -- 
Imposing Pain for Little Gain," World Trade Review, April 2013; "Green Subsidies and the WTO", 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2014/93, Sept. 2014; 
“Canada - Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law on Green and Not-So-Green Subsidies” (with 
Carolyn Fischer), World Trade Review, April 2015; “What the World Trade Organization Learned from 
the International Labour Organization” in Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2015); “John Jackson and the GATT's Transformation," 15 World Trade Review 401 (2016); "How 
American Rejectionism Undermines International Economic Law," Trade, Law & Development, 2018; "A 
WTO if you can keep it," Questions of International Law, Nov. 2019; "Grading Trump's China Trade 
Strategy," European Yearbook of International Economic Law, forthcoming 2019. 
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My writings over the past few years on the Blog about the Appellate Body are extensive and 
may be of use to future scholars who seek to understand how the Appellate Body came to be 
forsaken.  Blogs by their nature are ephemeral and not indexed.  Therefore, the purpose of this 
paper is to preserve my 2016-19 Blog posts regarding the Appellate Body in a form that will be 
usable by future scholars.  These posts are presented in chronological order starting in 2016. 
 
The 12 Blog Posts that I will include are: 
1.  The Obama Administration's Attack on Appellate Body Independence Shows the Need for 
Reforms. 
2.  How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump Administration. 
3.  A Defense of the Beleaguered WTO Appellate Body. 
4.  The WTO Appellate Body Crisis: A Critique of the EU's Article 25 Proposal. 
5.  Comments on the EU's Proposal for Article 25 Arbitration. 
6.  Comments on the Appellator Graham Affair. 
7. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 3 December 2019. 
8. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 4 December 2019. 
9. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 5 December 2019. 
10. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 6 December 2019. 
11.  The Myth of No WTO Precedent. 
12.  The Missed Opportunity to Save WTO Dispute Settlement. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. The Obama Administration's Attack on Appellate Body Independence Shows the Need for 
Reforms 
Steve Charnovitz 
22 September 2016 
The Obama Administration has not yet apologized for its unilateral action in May 2016 to 
unseat Appellate Body Member Seung Wha Chang, a distinguished jurist from South Korea. 
Although this hostile act by the United States has been roundly criticized by other governments 
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within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and by many outside commentators, the Obama 
Administration refused to back down from its action to threaten WTO judges with non-
reappointment if their judicial opinions rankle the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Ironically, 
although President Obama has rightly criticized the U.S. Senate for refusing, for political 
reasons, even to consider the President's mid-March Supreme Court nomination of Judge 
Merrick Garland even though that inaction leaves one Justice seat vacant, the Obama 
Administration engages in analogous politicization at the WTO that leaves one Appellator seat 
vacant. 
Although the Obama Administration had refused in 2011 to go along with the widely-supported 
reappointment of Appellate Body Member Jennifer Hillman from the United States, reportedly 
on the grounds that she had not upheld U.S. protectionist measures being challenged in WTO 
dispute settlement, this most recent Obama Administration action to blackball another 
country's judge is a more serious assault on judicial independence in the WTO. Starting next 
week (26 September 2016), the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is scheduled begin a 
focused discussion on improving the appointment process for Appellate Body Members. Below 
I offer a proposal to clarify the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) regarding 
reappointment. 
The Obama Administration announced its decision to block the reappointment of Judge Chang 
at the May 23 DSB meeting. The reason offered was that the Obama Administration disagreed 
with the jurisprudence articulated in four recent Appellate Body decisions on which Judge 
Chang was one of the three appellators on the division deciding the case. Two of those cases 
involved successful challenges by China against countervailing duties imposed by the Obama 
Administration. At the DSB Meeting, the Administration stated clearly that Appellate Body 
jurists needed to be "held responsible" and "accountable for the views they have endorsed" 
(Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 23 May 
2016). 
The Obama Administration's announcement elicited an outcry of opposition in the world trade 
community. According to an account of the DSB Meeting published by the WTO, numerous 
governments, led by South Korea, either objected to the U.S. position or expressed concerns 
about the damage that could be done to the WTO. The other complaining governments 
included Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, the European Union, Honduras, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Russia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay, and Viet Nam. Based on press accounts (as the official WTO minutes remain classified 
as of 22 September 2016), no government sided with the United States. (See "U.S. Slammed at 
DSB For Blocking Korean Appellate Body Reappointment", World Trade Online, 23 May 2016). 
By conditioning its support for a judicial reappointment on whether or not a WTO judge sides 
with the United States on the substance or process of WTO law, the Obama Administration 
strikes at the heart of the concept of judicial independence. In 1994, when the US Executive 
Branch sought Congressional approval for US membership in the WTO, the US "Statement of 
Administrative Action" characterized the new Appellate Body as being composed of "seven 
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independent experts" (SAA, p. 345). That Statement of Administrative Action was approved by 
the US Congress in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 USC §3511). But the WTO 
appellators can hardly be "independent" when they know that the United States (or any other 
WTO Member) will veto a reappointment as a way of making WTO judges "accountable for the 
reviews they have endorsed." 
I could not find any position paper on the USTR or White House websites explaining how the 
Obama Administration decided to target Judge Chang. The Administration did not seek any 
public comment on its plan to fire Judge Chang, and has not explained why the benefits to the 
United States from intimidating WTO judges will be greater than the costs to the United States 
of embarrassing South Korea and undermining the WTO. 
The US ouster of Judge Chang was an affront to South Korea. Chang was the first and so far only 
Korean judge to serve on the Appellate Body. In an article about this sordid episode in 
the Korea Times (see Choi Sung-jin, "US set to oust Korean judge from WTO appellate body," 1 
June 2016), an unnamed Korean government official is quoted as saying "We are explaining the 
iniquity of the U.S. moves to other member countries." That the Obama Administration singled 
out South Korea for the harsh judicial treatment should be put in context of the unfair way in 
which the Obama Administration has treated South Korea in bilateral trade relations. The most 
egregious conduct involved the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) that had been signed 
by both countries in 2007. After he took office, however, President Obama refused to send the 
KORUS to the Congress until Korea agreed to renegotiate the KORUS and accept more US 
protectionism. In particular, the Obama Administration pressured Korea to allow the 25% US 
tariff on imported trucks to remain in place for seven additional years rather than to begin to 
be phased out in the first year of the trade agreement. One wonders why in view of the 
increasing militarism in North Korea, the Obama Administration sees geopolitical reasons to 
embarrass the government and people of South Korea. 
The US ouster of Judge Chang was also an affront to the WTO. Already suffering a legitimacy 
crisis for its inability to complete ongoing Doha Round trade negotiations (owing in large part to 
weak USTR leadership), the WTO has been enjoying a legitimacy boost from its effective dispute 
settlement system. But when the Obama Administration forces a vacancy in the Appellate Body 
and politicizes the process of re-appointment, the future effectiveness of WTO dispute 
settlement is put at risk. 
The danger to the WTO dispute system was immediately grasped by the WTO community. The 
other six appellators sent a joint letter to the DSB Chair on 18 May 2016 observing that "The 
dispute settlement system depends on WTO Members trusting the independence and 
impartiality of Appellate Body Members. Linking the reappointment of a Member to specific 
case could affect that trust." In addition, the corps of retired WTO appellate judges voiced 
sharp criticism. In a letter dated 31 May 2016, all 13 former Appellate Body members wrote to 
the DSB chair to criticize the blocked reappointment. The letter observes that "all of the 
accomplishments of the past generation in establishing the credibility of the WTO dispute 
system can be put in jeopardy" by "inappropriate pressures by participants in the WTO system." 
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In addition, many WTO scholars have also been critical of the Obama Administration. For 
example, Professor Gregory Shaffer wrote: "USTR's hubris could be explained if this were 
Putin's Russia. Or perhaps Trump's America. But the Obama administration? Has this fallen 
outside the President's radar?" ("Will the US Undermine the World Trade Organization?, 23 
May 2016, The World Post). 
The Obama Administration's disrespect for the WTO comes at a precarious time in US trade 
politics when leading candidates in the upcoming elections are calling into question the 
benefits to the United States from international trade and from WTO Membership. It is not 
enough for a US President merely to say the right things as President Obama did at the United 
Nations on 20 September when he declared that "I believe that as imperfect as they are, the 
principles of open markets and accountable governance, of democracy and human rights and 
international law that we have forged remain the firmest foundation for human progress in this 
century." A President must also do the right things. And President Obama failed to do the right 
thing when he allowed (or ordered) his Administration to undermine judicial independence in 
international trade law and to unaccountably veto the reappointment of a distinguished Korean 
jurist supported by most (if not all) other WTO member governments. 
The continuing fallout from the US judicial veto calls for a decisive response at the WTO. At the 
DSB meeting next week, I propose that the Members promulgate new normative guidance on 
Appellate Body appointments. Happily, a made-to-order statement is available in the excellent 
letter from the 13 former appellators which states in one pertinent paragraph: 
"A decision on the reappointment of a Member of the Appellate Body should not be made on 
the basis of the decisions in which that Member has participated as a part of the divisions in 
particular appeals, lest the impartiality, the independence, and the integrity of that one 
Member, and, by implication, of the entire Appellate Body, be called into question. Nor should 
either appointment or reappointment to the Appellate Body be determined on the basis of 
doctrinal preference, lest the Appellate Body become a creature of political favor, and be 
reduced to a mere political instrument. Rather, as provided in Article 17.3 of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, the standard for both appointment and reappointment should be 
whether the person in question is 'of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally'." 
A decision adopting this policy statement can be taken in the DSB by consensus pursuant to 
DSB Article 1.4. 
Another reform I recommend is that the Appellate Body should adopt an amendment to its 
Working Procedures for Appellate Body Review (see WT/AB/WP/6, 2010, para. 2 (Duties and 
Responsibilities)) to make clear that Appellate Body members should not accept invitations to 
be interviewed by a WTO member regarding a reappointment. It has come to my attention that 
USTR's Geneva office has on recent occasion called in a sitting Appellate Body member to 
discuss her reappointment. Since the US government apparently cannot resist the temptation 
to engage in WTO-illegal ex parte communication with Appellate Body members, the Appellate 
Body, by its own rules, should forbid such reappointment interviews. 
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In summary, the Obama Administration should apologize to the WTO for the damage USTR has 
caused and the Administration should support the enactment of a DSB normative statement to 
depoliticize reappointments of WTO judges. 
Posted by Charnovitz on September 22, 2016 at 06:23 PM  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.  How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump Administration 
Steve Charnovitz 
3 November 2017 
The Trump Administration is trying to torpedo the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute 
settlement system.  According to the November 2, 2017 Wall Street Journal article "Has China 
Swallowed the WTO" by Jacob M. Schlesinger, "The Trump administration has escalated the 
Obama administration's battle over the appellate body, blocking appointments of any new 
judges and sparking fights even with members sympathetic to the U.S. campaign against 
China."  Schlesinger further explains that at the August 31 meeting of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), the United States "said it would block any attempt to fill those slots 
until 'longstanding' complaints about the court were addressed." 
In an earlier post, I reported on the Obama Administration's shameful intervention in 2016 to 
block the re-election of the judge from Korea.  See Steve Charnovitz, "The Obama 
Administration's Attack on Appellate Body Independence Shows the Need for Reforms," Sept. 
22, 2016.  Unfortunately, by getting away with that scheme, the US Trade Representative 
became emboldened to block future appointments to the Appellate Body.     
The current WTO judicial elections crisis is even worse as there are now two WTO appellator 
slots where new members are needed. A third seat on the seven-member Appellate Body will 
open on December 11, 2017 when the term ends for Prof. Peter Van den Bossche, the 
distinguished jurist from the European Union.  At the most recent DSB meeting for which the 
WTO has published minutes, on September 29, 2017, the minutes show the United States 
delegate saying that the United States "could not consider launching a selection process to fill a 
vacancy on the Appellate Body if the person to be replaced continued to serve and decide 
appeals."  See WTO, Appellate Body matters, September 29, 2017.  Under the Appellate Body 
Working Procedures, appellators actively serving as judges on a particular case have always 
continued to complete service on that case after their formal term expires.  
A vacancy of three of the seven members of the Appellate Body will put WTO dispute 
settlement into an existential crisis.  The shorthanded Appellate Body has already fallen behind 
its normal processing time in several cases, and with additional judges being eliminated, the 
continued viability of the DSU Article 17 right to appeal will be in doubt because each appeal 
must have a division of three appellators.  Even worse, the WTO dispute rules (Art. 16.4) delay 
the adoption of a panel report by the DSB "until after completion of the appeal."  So if the 
Trump Administration's intransigence renders the Appellate Body inutile, that also makes it 
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impractical to adopt any panel report because either party to the proceeding could lodge an 
appeal as a way to stop that case dead in its tracks.  That nightmare scenario would effectively 
put the entire WTO dispute settlement out of business. 
The Trump Administration is using this gambit to intimidate other countries to agree to its goals 
of watering down substantive trade disciplines and rules of WTO judicial 
procedure.  Governments that cherish the international economic rule of law see a hard choice 
between giving into U.S. protectionist demands and weakening the WTO enforcement system. 
(See Bryce Baschuk, "WTO Members Fired Up Over Appellate Body Obstruction by U.S," 
Bloomberg BNA International Trade Reporter, 34 ITR 1418, Oct. 26, 2017.) 
Happily a third option exists.  The Appellate Body can step in to shore up WTO dispute 
settlement.  Yet time is short because after December 11, there will be only a bare majority of 
the Appellate Body empowered to make decisions pursuant to Rules 3(1) and 15 of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Body Review.   
The third option is to amend the Appellate Body's Working Procedures.  Article 17.9 of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding empowers the Appellate Body to draw up Working 
Procedures in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the WTO Director-General.  This 
authority has been used regularly by the Appellate Body since February 1996.  The Appellate 
Body does not need U.S. consent to amend its Working Procedures.  
I propose that the Appellate Body amend Rule 20 of the Working Procedures to state that in the 
event of three or more expired terms in the Appellate Body membership, the Appellate Body 
will be unable to accept any new appeals.  Although the Appellate Body does not have the right 
to formally take away the right to appeal, it does have the right to declare in advance that 
under those extreme circumstances, the "completion of the appeal" will occur automatically on 
the same day that any new appeal is lodged.  In other words, by removing itself from the 
dispute process for new cases, a disabled Appellate Body will step aside so that the panel 
decision can automatically be adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on a timely 
basis.  For a depleted Appellate Body bench to continue processing new cases would 
necessarily cause huge delays, thus frustrating the Uruguay Round goals of a prompt dispute 
system.  (See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Mark Pollack, "Trump is fighting an open war on 
trade. His stealth war on trade may be even more important," Washington Post Monkey Cage, 
Sept. 27, 2017.)  The current docket of the Appellate Body already includes seven appeals that 
would be pursued to conclusion under my proposal.  But no new appeals would be processed 
after December 11, 2017. 
The creation of the second-level review by the Appellate Body was one of the most innovative 
and successful features of the WTO dispute understanding achieved during the Uruguay 
Round.   Foregoing appellate review would be a loss to the system, but the system could survive 
it temporarily.  While the attack on the independent Appellate Body by the Trump 
Administration is unfortunate and not easy to fight off due to consensus rulemaking in the DSB, 
the DSU rules do give the Appellate Body the tools to preserve much of the integrity of the 
WTO dispute panel system. 
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I urge the Appellate Body to erect this defense now before it is too late.  By limiting the 
potential damage to WTO dispute settlement in this way, the Appellate Body could, in effect, 
call the Trump Administration's bluff as to whether it wants to maintain the option of a United 
States appeal in future WTO panel decisions.     
Posted by Charnovitz on November 03, 2017 at 12:01 PM  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
3.  A Defense of the Beleaguered WTO Appellate Body 
Steve Charnovitz 
9 May 2019 
In November 2017, I authored a paper warning that the Trump Administration was seeking to 
eviscerate World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement. At the same time, I put forward 
a specific proposal for what the Appellate Body could do to save the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) of the WTO (Steve Charnovitz, "How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement 
from the Trump Administration, 3 November 2017, 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/11/how-to-save-wto-dispute-settlement-
from-the-trump-administration.html). My proposal was for the Appellate Body to amend its 
rules to state that in the event three or more vacant appellator slots existed, that the 
"completion of the appeal" would automatically occur on the same day that any appeal was 
lodged.  Had the Appellate Body adopted my plan, they could have insulated the WTO dispute 
system from the impending nightmare scenario of a right of any WTO defendant government to 
block the adoption of a WTO panel report merely by appealing it to an out-of-business 
Appellate Body.  
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not adopt my rescue plan. 
Now, over 18 months later, the WTO continues to struggle with the implications of United 
States rejectionism against the trading system. In recent weeks, I have noticed an increase in 
new disturbing trends at the WTO.  I've seen well-intentioned WTO member governments 
offering proposals to rewrite the DSU in an effort to appease the Trump Administration.  
I had hoped by now that governments had learned that appeasement of authoritarians never 
works. The Trump Administration is seeking to destroy the international rule of law on trade, 
and other WTO members should not be accomplices in this mayhem. 
There are worse things than losing an Appellate Body or losing the automatic adoption of WTO 
panel reports.  
On 7 May 2019 in Geneva, Trump's Ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea gave a tough speech 
to the WTO General Council.  The Ambassador's remarks were replete with misstatements of 
trade law and misstatements of fact. This was par for the course in an Administration that 
seems to believe that if one repeats a falsity enough, it will become true.  
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So far, I have not seen any refutation of Ambassador Shea's spurious assertions. So, for the 
record, let me debunk them one by one. 
Shea's first claim is that there is a DSU rule that "A person who has ceased to be an Appellate 
Body member may not continue deciding appeals as if his term has been extended by the 
Dispute Settlement Body."  That claim is untrue because the Appellate Body, pursuant to its 
authority in DSU Article 17.9, enacted Working Procedures back in the mid-1990s that provided 
for the contingency of an expiration of an appellator term during the pendency of an appeal on 
which the appellator had been assigned to "serve."  This administrative law (Rule 15) allows 
such an appellator to complete his or her service on that appeal.  The Trump Administration has 
suggested that Rule 15 is ultra vires, but DSU Article 17.1 does not contain any conflicting black 
letter law that in the event that an appellator term expires, the appellator must resign from a 
tribunal. 
Consider this counterfactual: If the Appellate Body had not written the wise contingency rule (in 
Rule 15), the Appellate Body would have had to discontinue many ongoing appeals when one of 
the sitting appellator's term ended.  Scotching ongoing appeals might have been convenient for 
the United States which is the most frequent WTO defendant and the most frequent loser of 
WTO cases against it.  But judicial dissolution would have been a bad outcome for the WTO 
dispute system. 
Second, Shea asserts that there is a DSU rule that "The Appellate Body may not make findings 
on issues of fact...."  No authority was offered for that proposition and certainly the DSU does 
not forbid the Appellate Body from making incidental statements of fact. Of course, the 
Appellate Body should not entertain new facts and or substitute itself for the panel's role as the 
trier of facts. But the Appellate Body has not done so. The DSU does say that appeals "are 
limited to issues of law," but that basis for appeal should not be understood to prohibit the 
Appellate Body from addressing the facts necessary to accomplish its mandate "to uphold, 
modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel" (DSU Article 17.13). 
Third, Shea asserts that there is a DSU rule that "The Appellate Body may not give advisory 
opinions on issues that will not assist the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] in making a 
recommendation to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into compliance with WTO rules." While 
there is no DSU rule stating that proposition exactly, no one would deny that the Appellate 
Body should not be issuing advisory opinions. But the Appellate Body has not issued such 
opinions.  Thus, Shea's assertion that "the DSU provides for rules, and "those rules have been 
broken with impunity by the Appellate Body" is false.  So is his assertion that the Appellate 
Body "is disregarding the clear rules." 
Fourth, Shea argues that there is a rule that "The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports 
serve as precedent or provide authoritative interpretations."  Certainly, nothing in the DSU 
prohibits tribunal decisions from being considered as precedent by future tribunals.  The entire 
history of dispute settlement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) going back 
to the early 1950s shows the regular attention by tribunals to precedent. Quite rightly, the 
Appellate Body has posited that absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the 
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same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case. Consistent with the approach taken 
by other newly-created international tribunals over the past century, the WTO Appellate Body 
has sought to clarify its role as a higher-level tribunal in a continuing legal system. As the DSU 
explains, WTO dispute settlement "is a central element in providing security and predictability 
to the multilateral trading system" (DSU Article 3.2).  Imagine the hypothetical of the Appellate 
Body stating in its rules that panels should feel free to consider every case de novo and to flout 
the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body.  Certainly, such a disconnected legal system would 
have failed to provide the security and predictability sought by the United States and other 
WTO governments who drafted the DSU. Finally, I know of no evidence that the Appellate Body 
has ever said that is rulings are "authoritative interpretations," and Shea cites no caselaw to 
that effect.  
Fifth, Shea states that "the Appellate Body may not change Members' substantive rights or 
obligations as set in the text of the WTO agreements." That statement is true as evidenced by 
DSU Article 19.2. But the Trump Administration's assertion that the Appellate Body has broken 
this rule is false.  The biggest problem the United States has with the Appellate Body is that the 
United States has lost an obscene number (presently 49) cases against it for violating WTO 
trade remedy rules.  The perennial arguments by the US Trade Representative about the 
Appellate Body have little to do with WTO constitutional principles. Rather, the behavior of US 
trade officials can be explained by the longtime US abuse of trade remedies (like antidumping 
duties) to protect politically connected US industries. 
Seventh, Shea asserts that "the Appellate Body must circulate its reports within 90 days of an 
appeal." Under DSU Article 17.5, the 90-day deadline is real.  And it's true that the Appellate 
Body has in recent years often missed that deadline.  But to assert that the Appellate Body is 
"disregarding" this clear timing rule is a false claim.  A missed deadline by the Appellate Body is 
not an expression of its agency, but rather a manifestation of the principle of necessity. Every 
time it misses the 90-day deadline, the Appellate Body explains why in advance.  The top reason 
has been the lack of judicial or staff resources.  
Under WTO law, WTO members have an obligation to provide the Appellate Body "with 
appropriate administrative and legal support as it requires" (DSU Article 17.7 emphasis added) 
and to fill appellator vacancies "as they arise" (DSU Article 17.2)  WTO Members have failed to 
fulfill those two key administrative obligations, and the Appellate Body should not be blamed 
for those failures. 
During the past week in meetings in Washington, DC, I have heard it said several times that the 
Appellate Body is guilty of "overreaching" and that it is "exceeding its mandate."  Such mantras 
are not true, no matter how often they are repeated.  Since 1996, I have examined over 140 
WTO Appellate Body decisions.  I have discussed many of them in my classes and wrote 
commentary on more than I wish to remember.  Sometimes by my lights, the Appellate Body 
gets its wrong.  But like any independent international or domestic court, the Appellate Body is 
interpreting and enforcing the law as it sees it.  
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It's a myth that the Appellate Body is "overreaching", "coloring outside the lines", "exceeding its 
mandate" or any of the other similar criticisms being hurled at the Appellate Body by bullies 
who know that the Appellate Body will refrain from trying to defend itself. 
I am happy to defend the Appellate Body.  And WTO Member governments need to stand up to 
the Trump Administration and not cave into its efforts to crush the WTO compliance system. 
 
Posted by Charnovitz on May 09, 2019 at 03:34 PM 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.  The WTO Appellate Body Crisis: A Critique of the EU's Article 25 Proposal 
Steve Charnovitz 
2 June 2019 
Recent reports indicate that the EU is proposing to use Article 25 of the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide a temporary solution to the ongoing crisis in the 
Appellate Body of not having enough appellators to adjudicate appeals and to render panel 
reports adoptable (see World Trade Online," EU Moving forward with WTO Appellate Body 
backup plan", 31 May 2019). Although I have not yet seen any EU paper, the urgency of the 
matter provides a good reason to begin an analysis of pros and cons of this backup plan.   
The crisis in the Appellate Body is that its judicial bench is now down to only three appellators 
and two of those terms will end in December 2019.  With fewer than three appellators, the 
Appellate Body will not be able to decide appeals.  Furthermore, under DSU Article 16.4, any 
panel decision under appeal is not eligible for automatic adoption until the "completion of the 
appeal." Thus, without the possibility of appeal, any defendant in a WTO case can block the 
adoption of a panel report merely by appealing "into the void".  Without adoptability of panel 
reports, the predictability and security provided by the DSU will disappear.  
The reason why four of the seven seats on the Appellate Body remain unfilled is that the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has failed in its duty under DSU Article 17.2 to fill vacancies "as 
they arise."  The cause of this failure is that since 2017, the United States has been blocking the 
appointment process.  The blocking of appointments was not invented by the Trump 
Administration -- the prior art came in the blocking of an appellator reappointment by the 
Obama Administration -- but the Trump Administration perfected the heinous art through the 
more destructive goal of attacking the tribunal itself rather than just particular judges.  See 
Steve Charnovitz, "How American Rejectionism Undermines International Economic 
Law," Trade, Law and Development, Winter 2018.   
Beginning in 2017, the looming danger of a halt in the adoptability on WTO panel reports led to 
numerous proposals being offered to address this predicament. My own proposal, published in 
this blog on 3 November 2017, would have headed off the problem by having the Appellate 
Body change its rules so as to declare ex ante that whenever the Appellate Body bench fell 
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below five judges, then for any appealed case, the "completion of the appeal" would occur on 
the same day that the appeal was filed.  Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not adopt my 
solution for reasons that have not been publicly disclosed.  Ironically, at a time when the 
Appellate Body is regularly criticized for "activism," the failure of the Appellate Body to adopt a 
DSU defense measure is an example of its inactivism.  Given the procedural situation in 2017, 
only the Appellate Body had the power to clear the way for future panel report adoptions even 
in the worst-case scenario of the number of appellators falling to zero.  In my view, the 
Appellate Body had the last clear chance (and perhaps the duty) to enable the WTO to avoid 
the worst aspects of the current predicament.  To quote Professor Peter Van den Bossche in his 
recent address to the DSB, "History will not judge kindly those responsible for the collapse of 
the WTO dispute settlement system." 
With the calendar advancing to June 2019, the EU proposal is to utilize DSU Article 25.  Under 
DSU Article 25, WTO governments can employ arbitration as an alternative to DSU Article 6 
panels.  Such arbitration requires "mutual agreement of the parties" and DSU Article 25.3 states 
that parties "shall agree to abide by the arbitration award."  Should a party not abide by the 
award, Article 25.4 provides for enforcement through the regular techniques of compliance 
review by an appealable panel report and determination of any SCOO (i.e., a suspension of 
concessions or other obligations) through arbitration.  
As a solution to being able to achieve finality in WTO disputes, Article 25 arbitration does not 
offer any advantages over regular DSU panels.  The Article 25 approach works only if there is ex 
ante agreement of the litigants to use the parallel track. But if litigants can mutually agree to 
arbitration without appeal, then the same litigants could also mutually agree to enter into a 
procedural agreement not to appeal the Article 6 panel report and the Article 21 compliance 
panel report.  Staying within the normal panel process offers considerable advantages over ad 
hoc arbitration as there are already broadly accepted Working Procedures and thus no need to 
reinvent them for each arbitration.  Staying within the regular panel process also provides a 
proven path for adjudicating and enforcing compliance which is absent in Article 25. (While it is 
true that if governments abide by an arbitration award there would not be any need for 
enforcement, it is similarly true that if governments followed WTO rules, then would not be any 
need for dispute settlement.) 
The only advantage offered by Article 25 is to employ it in a way that makes improvements on 
regular WTO dispute settlement.  Specifically, under Article 25, litigants could agree ex ante 
that the arbitrator may award monetary damages should violation of WTO rules be found and 
that the monetary award would be rendered in a manner so as to make it eligible for 
enforcement in domestic courts under the New York Convention (including its defenses).  The 
use of monetary awards and domestic enforceability is not available in DSU panels, and so 
experimenting with Article 25 in that way would provide value added. 
At this point, the best path forward for WTO members that support the rule of law is to sign on 
to a Non-Appeal Pact (NAP) in advance so as to agree reciprocally not to appeal WTO panel 
reports during the ongoing crisis.  If most of the active DSU litigants were to sign this Pact, the 
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ongoing crisis could be mitigated considerably for cooperating countries.  (Obviously this Pact 
cannot resuscitate the Appellate Body; even my own plan of 2017 recognized that there was no 
back door rescue for the Appellate Body itself.) 
To give concreteness to this idea, here is language that has been suggested for such a NAP: 
WTO Membership No-Appeal Pact (NAP) 
Recognizing that as of 11 December 2019, the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) may no longer have the minimum required number of 
members to commence an appeal, and 
Being desirous to maintain, even in such situation, rule-based WTO dispute 
settlement and the adoption of WTO dispute settlement reports by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) pursuant to the rule of negative consensus as 
set out in Articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),   
We agree: 
To refrain from appealing a panel report in a dispute where all of the other 
parties in the dispute are signatories to this No-Appeal Pact; 
That this Pact will go into operation on the date that the number of Appellate 
Body members falls below three and will end on the date that the number of 
Appellate Body members rises above four; and 
That this Pact is an informal understanding of representatives of the Members 
and does not alter the rights and obligations of the Members. 
Signatories: 
Posted by Charnovitz on June 02, 2019 at 02:45 PM 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
5. Comments on the EU's Proposal for Article 25 Arbitration 
Steve Charnovitz 
6 June 2019 
This is a follow-up to my earlier post "The WTO Appellate Body Crisis - A Critique of the EU's 
Article 25 Proposal."  See <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/06/the-wto-appellate-body-
crisis-a-critique-of-the-eus-article-25-proposal.html>. 
Thanks to Tom Miles for posting the Draft 5.16.19 document that the EU has circulated to the 
WTO for an Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement based on DSU Article 25. 
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The draft agreement would be entered into bilaterally by the EU and another WTO member to 
agree to resort to arbitration under DSU Article 25 for appeals of final WTO panel reports in the 
event that the Appellate Body is not operational.  The appeal to the arbitral panel would be 
instead of Appellate Body review.  The EU paper contemplates using the Director-General (DG) 
to appoint three former Appellate Body members to hear the appeal and to use the Appellate 
Body Secretariat for administrative and legal support.  Such duties for the DG and the Appellate 
Body Secretariat are not contemplated in the DSU, but seem reasonable to me.  
Although the EU has shown creativity with its CETA Investment Court, I am less impressed with 
the idea of an ad hoc appellate tribunal composed of retired appellators. Using former 
Appellate Body judges is not the same thing as having an Appellate Body with collegiality to 
hand down decisions.  I am not aware of any precedent for replacing an appellate tribunal with 
ADR of retired judges.  I think this idea devalues the idea of an appellate jurisdiction.  I don't see 
why the second panel of three arbitrators should be viewed as more authoritative than the first 
panel.  I am not aware that the EU currently offers an ADR fast track to its European Court of 
Justice. I would not want to see the Appellate Body permanently replaced by ad hoc ADR, or for 
that matter an ad hoc judicial machine learning apparatus in the event that three retired 
Appellate Body members were not available.   
Posted by Charnovitz on June 06, 2019 at 03:58 PM 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
6.  Comments on the Appellator Graham Affair 
Steve Charnovitz 
2 December 2019 
A report on World Trade Online this afternoon states that Appellate Body Chair Thomas Graham is 
threatening to resign from the Appellate Body when his term ends on December 10 unless the 
WTO ousts the Mr. Werner Zdouc, the accomplished and respected Director of the Appellate 
Body Secretariat. 
I hope that this report is not true. 
Back in September, this Blog featured a report that Mr. Graham was threatening to resign 
unless the WTO moved to adopt changes in DSU rules that addressed criticisms by the US. 
In response, on 26 September 2019, I posted the following comment on the Blog: 
"I have no problem with Graham quitting on December 10. He signed on for 8 years and the 8 
years are almost over. It's not his fault that the US government has blocked a replacement for 
him. The replacement should have been agreed to months ago so that the new member could 
have been available on December 10. I would object to Graham's reported statement that 
whether he stays or not depends on whether the WTO adopts reforms. It is clearly 
inappropriate for Appellators to insert themselves into WTO negotiations. I have also taken 
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note of Appellate Body Rule 2(3) which states 'A Member shall exercise his/her office without 
accepting or seeking instructions from any international, governmental, or non-governmental 
organization or any private source.' In my view, an Appellate Body member who cannot abide 
by that requirement should not continue to serve on the Appellate Body." 
In response to my comment, on 28 September, Mr. Graham posted on the Blog: 
"The remark about Rule 2(3) requires a reply. When I joined the AB eight years ago, I said I 
would never take a position because it was a position of my government, but equally, I would 
not be intimidated out of taking a position that coincided with that of my government, if I 
believed the position was correct. I have lived by that principle and continue to do so in the 
present circumstances. It would be more constructive to address my positions on their merits, 
instead of by insinuation." 
At that time, in late September, out of respect for the court, I decided to give Mr. Graham the 
last word. 
But with the latest news, the time has come to address Mr. Graham's statements on the merits. 
As I said back in September, I have no problem with a decision by Mr. Graham to step down on 
December 10. He has no obligation to stay on if he doesn't want to see his ongoing cases to 
conclusion.  As I said, it's not his fault that a new appellator is not on deck to take over his seat 
on December 10 under Rule 13. 
But I do have a problem with Appellate Body members seeking to insinuate themselves into the 
international legislative process by unilaterally lobbying for particular changes in WTO rules or 
for a particular timetable to make legislative changes.  The role of the WTO appellate judge is to 
remain impartial in deciding cases and to avoid taking any political positions within the WTO. On 
the merits, WTO judges should stay out of WTO negotiations unless their technical advice is 
specifically requested by negotiators.  
As to the directorship of the Appellate Body secretariat, while I am not familiar with the 
customary practices for the selection of Appellate Body staff, I presume that the Appellate Body 
should have some say in the Director's post.  With only three appellators in place, however, the 
Appellate Body lacks a quorum to act on personnel matters.  (Indeed, in the present 
circumstances, I question the assumption that an Appellate Body member whose term has 
expired can complete any appeal under Rule 15 because gaining the authorization of the 
Appellate Body is a prerequisite for such an extension of service.)  Therefore, I see no reason 
for the WTO Director-General to take any guidance regarding Mr. Zdouc from Mr. 
Graham.  Indeed, if the report is true that the Director-General has resisted pressure from Mr. 
Graham to oust Mr. Zdouc, then I commend the Director-General for providing yet another 
example of his continuing strong and enlightened leadership.  
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Werner Zdouc is a distinguished international civil servant and he deserves better than to be 
held hostage to the continuing assaults by the Trump Administration on world trade and 
international law.  
Posted by Charnovitz on December 02, 2019 at 08:45 PM 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7.  The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 3 December 2019 
Steve Charnovitz 
I was delighted to see the open letter from two current and one former member of the 
Appellate Body disputing yesterday's news item that various Appellate Body members are 
seeking the ouster of the Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat. 
When I wrote my post yesterday "Comments on the Appellator Graham Affair" I directed my 
remarks only to Graham and not to any of the other Appellate Body members who were 
mentioned in the news item.  I am not surprised to hear that the news item contained 
misrepresentations and misinformation.  To repeat what I said in my post yesterday, I hope that 
the allegations about Graham are also untrue. 
The rapid denials by three appellators (not including Graham) should be another reminder to 
the WTO community of how successful the Appellate Body experiment has been.  Looking back 
to 1995, the individuals elected by the WTO to be appellate judges have served with distinction 
and honor.  I can't think of any international court where the quality of judging overall has been 
as good as it has been on the Appellate Body. 
Therefore, I am constantly amazed at the public relations success of the Trump Administration 
in getting its anti-Appellate Body narrative accepted, in the absence of any evidentiary basis.  It 
is now a commonplace that Appellate Body members go to work every morning thinking about 
how they can exceed their mandate, engage in judicial overreach, deny rights, and add 
obligations. The Trump Administration has accused the Appellate Body of becoming a rogue 
organization that routinely breaks the rules and people who should know better assume that 
the Administration is telling the truth.  If the Trump Administration's story is to be believed, the 
WTO appellators perform so badly in their role that they operate beyond the pale of how 
national or international judges perform.  And the most remarkable charge in the US indictment 
of the runaway Appellate Body is that for 24 years WTO members persist in selecting by 
consensus new WTO judges who immediately begin to commit the identical judicial errors (such 
as following precedent) that were made by the previous judges on the Appellate Body.  
For the Trump Administration, the WTO Appellate Body was an ideal target to bully and 
denigrate because WTO appellators would behave as international judges and not fight 
back.  But why have the supporters of the rule of law not fought back? 
 




8. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 4 December 2019 
Steve Charnovitz 
At today's DSB meeting, press reports state that the US representative "charged that China and 
the EU, in calling for the continued use of Rule 15, were supporting what the U.S. sees as the 
Appellate Body’s blatant rule breaking."  In addition, the US representative was reported to 
have complained that "we have heard today statements actively encouraging the Appellate 
Body to continue to break the rules set out in the DSU."  Such USTR arguments, if they were 
actually made, demonstrate clearly the tendency of the Trump Administration to project its 
own addiction to rule breaking onto others and to improperly accuse judges and courts of 
breaking rules.  
As the representative from China carefully and thoughtfully explained at the DSB today: Rule 15 
"is in conformity" with the DSU and "has been applied on a number of occasions for over 
twenty years. These precedents have established a routine and customary practice agreed on 
by all WTO Members which, prior to the end of August 2017, the United States had never 
objected to." 
The Trump Administration, of course, is free to change the US government's position regarding 
the validity or appropriateness of Rule 15.  But as with any action by the Trump Administration, 
one has to ask what the motive would be in changing the US position so many years after the 
working procedure was established.  Plainly, the motive of the USTR in raising this sham 
objection regarding the Appellate Body was to justify the false accusation that the Appellate 
Body has acted ultra vires.  
The more the Trump Administration takes outlandish positions at the DSB, the more the United 
States will marginalize itself in the vital work of the WTO.  
 
Posted by Charnovitz on December 04, 2019 at 08:14 PM  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 5 December 2019 
Steve Charnovitz 
A story on World Trade Online by Hannah Monicken just crossed my desk in which she wrote: 
"Even those who do not view Zdouc as part of the problem could begin to view his now-public 
divisiveness as a reason he should go, according to one source -- especially if (sic) would be key 
to appeasing the U.S. and getting the Appellate Body back in business." 
The idea of "appeasing" the US government prompts me to take note of some guidance that I 
have offered numerous times over the past two years and memorialized recently in my essay "A 
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WTO if you can keep it" published 30 November 2019 http://www.qil-qdi.org/a-wto-if-you-can-keep-
it/ 
Let me restate the guidance here: 
"Both in the workshops and in the public fora, the key advice I constantly offer is that other 
WTO members should not make the situation worse by offering to appease the Trump 
Administration. As history has shown, the appeasement of dictators never works." 
As a longtime USTR watcher, I can assure everyone that firing Werner Zdouc is not going to 
appease the Trump Administration regarding the WTO.  It won't move the ball on issues such as 
reappointing 8 WTO appellate judges or getting multilateral trade negotiations moving forward. 
In my Blog posting of 2 December "Comments on the Appellator Graham Affair," I discussed the 
shameful efforts to oust Mr. Zdouc, the Appellate Body (AB) Secretariat Director.  
Amazingly to me, one respected trade law scholar commented "I agree, but to sacrifice the AB 
in order to save the job of one person (or even out of principle) also appears shortsighted." 
Let me briefly respond by stating what should be obvious in an international legal 
system.  Acting out of principle is what makes such systems work.  Resisting extortionist 
demands to remove Mr. Zdouc is a step that will help preserve the rule of law at the WTO.  If 
the AB is to be sacrificed on the altar of Trumpism, then let it be sacrificed.  But one should not 
commit acts of injustice as a way of trying to save a judicial system. 
  
Posted by Charnovitz on December 05, 2019 at 08:22 PM 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
10. The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 6 December 2019 
Steve Charnovitz 
The WTO community is abuzz about a draft Decision that is slated to be considered by the WTO 
General Council on Monday.  The Decision on "Functioning of the Appellate Body" is posted on 
the WTO portal. 
The Decision is designated as an Article IX:1 decision of the General Council acting between 
meetings of the Ministerial Conference.  Here I might note that contrary to WTO rules, the 
Ministerial Conference has failed to meet as required in 2019. 
The WTO Agreement in Article IX:1 provides for decisions by the Ministerial Conference and 
General Council that can be taken by a majority vote.  The precise scope of the competence to 
issue such decisions with legal effect is not delineated in the WTO Agreement.  Many years ago, 
I pointed out that there surely is some competence (see Steve Charnovitz, "The Legal Status of 
the Doha Declarations", JIEL, March 2002).  But there are also some limitations.  For example, 
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Article IX:1 authority cannot be used to issue authoritative interpretation of the WTO 
Agreement or to amend the WTO Agreement.  
The Draft Decision reads as if it is meant to have legal effect. For example, it starts with 
"transitional rules" (emphasis added) for outgoing Appellate Body members. The Draft Decision 
announces a number of policies "to enhance the functioning" of the DSU.  In some instances, 
the announced policy is already reflected in DSU rules. For example, paragraph 18 repeats the 
rule and mantra that panels, the Appellate Body, and the DSB cannot add to or diminish rights 
and obligations.  In other instances, the Decision seems to assert a new rule.  For example, 
paragraph 5 would preclude the Appellate Body from assigning an appellator to a division if 
there is less than 60 days remaining in that appellator's term.  And in several instances, the 
Decision simply makes an observation (for example, paragraph 16) that may or may not be true. 
The intent of the Decision seems to be to bow to many of the demands of USTR by imposing 
new limits on the Appellate Body.  For example, the Decision (para. 6) limits the ability of an 
Appellate Body member serving on a division at the time that her term expires from completing 
work on the appeal.  The Decision (paras 7 and 8) limits the Appellate Body from taking more 
than 90 days to complete an appeal without approval of the parties.  The Decision (para. 11) 
prohibits the Appellate Body from engaging in the "complete the analysis" practice although 
the Decision does not clearly state what it means by that.  The Decision (para. 13) prohibits the 
Appellate Body from ruling on issues that have not been raised by either party. In my view, 
these limitations on the Appellate Body are properly viewed as amendments to the DSU or as 
authoritative interpretations.  I find it hard to square these limitations with WTO Article IX:1 
authority as it applies to the General Council convened as the DSB. 
Despite the goal stated by the Decision to "enhance the functioning" of the DSU, I believe that 
by dignifying and giving into the invalid criticisms of the US government, the result of the 
Decision would be the exact opposite.  That is, the Decision would undermine the functioning 
of the DSU.  For example, Paragraph 15 declares that "Precedent is not created" through the 
DSU.  If the purpose of this normative statement is to say previous cases have to be irrelevant 
to panels, arbitrators, and appellators, then this clearly would undermine the functioning of the 
DSU or any legal system.  On the other hand, a statement that previous decisions are 
not binding precedent would be consistent with WTO jurisprudence.  
Thus far, I have identified two problems with the Decision: first, that it may be legislative 
overreach under Article IX:1 authority and second, that the substance of the actions may 
undermine the functioning of the Appellate Body.  The biggest problem with the Decision, 
however, is that it is not stylized as a decision of the DSB.  If the DSB were to enact this Decision, 
it would have to do so by consensus (see WTO Agreement footnote 3).  So, I think what is going 
on is that the DSB is being bypassed so that the authors of this Decision can seek to get it 
enacted by a majority vote rather than consensus.  That is the most serious flaw with the 
Decision.  The goal seems to be to enact a Decision responsive to the (bogus) US complaints and 
to do so through a procedure that does not require US support. 
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The proponents of this Decision are playing a dangerous game.  The never utilized authority in 
DSU Article IX:1 to proceed with majority voting is a precious constitutional resource that 
should not be wasted on an unnecessary and ill-considered initiative.  Even worse, by using 
majority voting for the first time on a matter that clearly is ineligible for majority voting 
(because it falls within the jurisdiction of the DSB rather than the General Council), the WTO 
would be disregarding the rule of law.  




11.  The Myth of No WTO Precedent: The Attack on the Appellate Body- Events of 9 December 
2019 
Steve Charnovitz 
Today in Geneva, the US ambassador to the WTO, Dennis Shea delivered a Statement to the 
General Council that was posted on the US Mission portal. 
His Statement is replete with misstatements.  
I hope that WTO member governments thoroughly debunked Shea's Statement today at the 
General Council. 
I don't have the time this evening to respond to every falsehood in Shea's new statement.  But 
let me to respond to one aspect of Shea's Statement which has been a persistent element in 
USTR's false narrative about the Appellate Body and WTO dispute settlement. That is, USTR's 
assertion that recourse to precedent by the Appellate Body and the panels is improper.  For 
example: 
            --Shea says that WTO governments "agree that 'precedent' is not created through WTO 
dispute settlement."  
            --He objects to the fact that Appellate Body decisions "assert a precedential value for its 
reports...." 
            --He claims that regarding its use of precedent, the "Appellate Body has relied on the 
reference in the DSU to security and predictability to justify its 'cogent reasons” approach." 
            --He suggests that "some Appellate Body members view themselves as “appellate 
judges”... serving on a “World Trade Court” that is the “centerpiece” of the WTO dispute 
settlement system ...rather than one component of it.  Such an expansive vision of the 
Appellate Body is not reflected in the DSU and was not agreed to by the United States." 
            --He argues that "there has been no discussion of why the Appellate Body has departed 
from its agreed role." 
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Let's start with the myth that WTO tribunals are committing legal error by utilizing precedent 
and that US government expected or wanted WTO jurisprudence to be precedent-free. 
Using precedent is a hallmark of any legal system both ancient and modern.  Reliance on 
customary practices was the central feature of transnational Merchant Law beginning in the 
Middle ages and attention to precedent and caselaw is part of the history of the development 
of modern commercial and maritime law. 
In the United States, domestic courts regularly make use of the precedential value of previous 
cases.  In its very first case in 1791, West v. Barnes, the US Supreme Court's (unreported) 
opinion is said to have taken note of the caselaw of state courts and English courts.  In its very 
first case in 1980, the US Court of International Trade (American Schack Co. v. United States) 
cites numerous prior customs court and appellate decisions.   
International courts also use and rely upon precedent.  For example, early decisions of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) cited previous decisions in the same court.  For 
example, in the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions case (1925), the PCIJ refers to a previous 
PCIJ decision (see pages 21, 26).  In the Factory at Chorzow case (1927), the PCIJ refers to two of 
its previous decisions (see pages 5, 9, 12, 20, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, and 31).  The same judicial 
practices unabashedly continued into the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  For example, in its 
first case in Corfu Channel (1948), the ICJ cited a PCIJ decision on the same point (see page 28). 
Given the longtime use of precedent in other international law tribunals, the use of caselaw 
became a hallmark of the dispute system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).  This did not occur immediately, but got into full swing by the mid-1970s.  For example, 
in 1976, the GATT panels adjudicating four tax cases involving the United States as either a 
plaintiff or defendant considered previous GATT caselaw.  In all four of these cases (involving 
defendants Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States), at the end of the panel's 
analysis, the panel stated: "In the light of the above,  and bearing in mind the precedent set by 
the Uruguayan case (BISD 11 Supp. p. 100), the panel found...."  All four of these decisions were 
adopted with USTR approval by the GATT Council in 1981 subject to an Understanding.  (In my 
view, the Appellate Body in February 2000 gave short shrift to this 1981 Understanding; while I 
have criticized that Appellate Body decision over the years, there is a world of conceptual 
difference between criticizing a particular judicial ruling and accusing the court of overreach or 
underreach.  For the USTR of today, losing a WTO claim is never because USTR argued it poorly 
or because it was a bad claim; rather for USTR, losing a WTO claim is to be blamed on 
misbehavior by the WTO tribunal.)  
When the WTO dispute settlement began in 1995, WTO panels continued the customary 
practice of GATT panels of utilizing prior caselaw.  In my view, WTO tribunals acted in this way 
not just to achieve the DSU Article 3.2 goals of "security and predictability."  Rather, WTO 
panels were also following the mandate set by consensus by the GATT member governments 
who wrote the WTO Agreement.  To wit, Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement calls for the WTO 
be "guided by the decisions, procedures, and customary practices" followed in the GATT.  In the 
false narrative purveyed by the Trump Administration, it is said that the US government never 
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agreed to a "vision" that caselaw should have "precedential value" for WTO panelists or 
appellators.  Neither Ambassador Shea nor USTR, to my knowledge, has ever offered any 
evidence for this ridiculous assertion.  
In fact, all of the evidence is on the other side of the argument.  If WTO panels were not 
supposed to consider prior caselaw, then why did USTR in the very first WTO case, US 
- Gasoline (1996), seek to buttress its arguments by citing a previous GATT panel ruling (see 
para. 3.62).  Why did USTR in lodging the US v. Japan Alcohol case (1996) cite prior caselaw in 
making its arguments (see paras. 4.7, 4.18, 4.27, 4.29).  And when it argued before the 
Appellate Body in Japan - Alcohol, why did USTR cite a GATT panel case as authority (see pages 
4-5).  And when it argued as plaintiff before the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals, why did 
USTR cite three previous Appellate Body reports (see pages 12-13) as authority?  The answer is 
that the United States in 1995-97 was comfortable with asking WTO tribunals to hand down 
decisions based on prior caselaw. 
Today, the Trump Administration is uncomfortable with the way that judicial precedent is being 
used in domestic and international courts to find violations of law by the Trump Administration 
and the United States.  I can understand their embarrassment that so many domestic and 
international judges are properly ruling against them.  But losing cases at the Appellate Body 
does not in any way justify the shameful and cowardly attack by the Trump Administration on 
the Appellate Body.  The truth is that if the Trump Administration were not engaging in so many 
protectionist, mercantilist, and other abusive non-market practices, then it would not be losing 
so many WTO cases against the United States. 
To be sure, there can be valid differences in the ways that various legal systems and various 
courts use their own caselaw and the caselaw of other courts.  One can debate in what 
circumstances judicial precedent is, or should be, binding upon a court.  With respect to the 
WTO, the Appellate Body has never held its own precedent to be legally binding on it or on 
WTO panels. In my understanding of the Appellate Body's (quite limited) "cogent reasons" 
jurisprudence, the Appellate Body is suggesting that its caselaw is not legally binding on panels 
and that panels have a right to fail to follow Appellate Body precedent if the panel has a cogent 
reason for doing so.  Of course, the Appellate Body would then have the authority to reverse 
the panel for a legal error if the Appellate Body did not agree with the cogent reason.  
At the General Council, Shea lamented that there "has been no discussion of why the Appellate 
Body has departed from its agreed role." The truth is that the Appellate Body has not departed 
from the role assigned to it in the DSU.  For years now the Trump Administration has 
intentionally perpetrated a myth that the Appellate Body has operated outside the lines of 
what governments expected in 1994 when the Appellate Body was written into the 
DSU.  Contrary to that myth, the creation of the Appellate Body was such a novel and 
innovative achievement in international law that WTO member governments did not express 
and could not have had any precise legitimate expectations as to how the legal experiment 
would play out.  The very essence of an appellate court is to exercise supervision over a lower 
court.  In such uncharted waters, the Appellate Body had to write its rules and establish its 
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customary practices by drawing on analogies from national law systems and from other 
international courts that act as agents of governments.  As I wrote in my 2005 article The World 
Trade Organization in 2020, the early Appellate Body did a darn good job in helping the WTO 
achieve the hopes of many generations of trade supporters for a better international rule of law 
in trade. 
In my scholarly writings and in my teaching of trade law, I do sometimes refer to the WTO 
dispute settlement system as a "World Trade Court."  I know that USTR does not like that term, 
but their problem with it is more the first two words than the third.  
When it was established in 1995, the WTO was endowed with the best architecture for 
compliance review and enforcement of any international organization.  The Trump 
Administration's attack on the Appellate Body has now disabled the extraordinary achievement 
in the WTO to have operated a cutting edge and  effective dispute and implementation system 
for the past 25 years.  In looking at the havoc that USTR has wreaked on the WTO, I am 
reminded of the adage of longtime U.S. Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn: "Any jackass can 
kick a barn down, but it takes a good carpenter to build one."  The WTO dispute system was 
built by good carpenters from around the world including in USTR in the early 1990s as led by 
Ambassador Carla Hills and Ambassador Mickey Kantor.  For US trade policy today, sadly, the 
good carpenters are gone.  
 




12.  The Missed Opportunity to Save WTO Dispute Settlement:  The Attack on the Appellate 
Body - Events of 10 December 2019 
Steve Charnovitz 
Today, the Standing Appellate Body was felled by the attack of the Trump Administration. By 
making appellate adjudications impossible, the Trump Administration is now empowered to 
strategically appeal any WTO panel decision against the US knowing that such appeal will 
prevent the panel report from being adopted.  The Trump Administration may not appeal every 
panel decision, but they will surely appeal any compliance panel decision holding against the 
US. 
This is a serious blow to the rule of law in the world trading system.  
I did my best to head this off this looming disaster over two years ago when I posted the article 
"How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump 
Administration" https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/11/how-to-save-wto-
dispute-settlement-from-the-trump-administration.html.  My solution was for the Appellate 
Body to immediately announce that whenever three or more vacancies exist on the Appellate 
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Body, no new appeals would be accepted.  This result could have been accomplished by 
adopting a new DSU Article 17.9 Working Procedure stating that the "completion of the appeal" 
under DSU Article 16.4 would "occur automatically on the same day that any new appeal is 
lodged." This solution would have enabled the DSB to move ahead with the adoption of WTO 
panel reports without benefit of a second-level review.  
My recent essay "A WTO if you can keep it" presents the history of the trading system as 
context for discussing the campaign of the Trump Administration to checkmate international 
trade law.  One part of my essay tells the story of my rescue plan and provides a legal analysis 
of it.  My essay was published in November 2019 on QIL at http://www.qil-qdi.org/a-wto-if-you-
can-keep-it/. An abstract appears on SSRN at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3498574.   
The WTO would not have suffered today's damaging blow if the Appellate Body had adopted 
my solution while there was still time to do so.  The optimal window for the Appellate Body to 
have acted began on 4 November 2017 (the day after I posted my article) when there were only 
two appellator vacancies.  The optimal window for action ended on 11 December 2017 when a 
third appellator vacancy occurred.  Less optimally, the Appellate Body could have adopted my 
proposal up to 30 September 2018 when a fourth vacancy ensued and the Appellate Body lost 
its judicial quorum (i.e., 4 of 7) for adopting new rules.  
I am often asked how events would have played out if the Appellate Body had taken my 
advice.  In this essay, I answer that question by laying out a ceteris paribus scenario of what 
would have happened if the Appellate Body had erected my proposed safety net on 10 
December 2017 (the last day where there were five appellators in place).  I call this alternative 
future the "Saved DSU Scenario."  In this scenario, the Appellate Body would have stopped 
accepting new appeals on 12 December 2017 after the number of appellators had fallen from 5 
to 4.  
Nothing would have happened until late February 2018.  On 22 February 2018, the panel in the 
Japan v. Korea Radionuclides case (DS 495) issued its decision.  This panel found SPS violations 
by South Korea.  In real life, the panel report was appealed on 9 April 2018, and on 26 April 
2019, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report which narrowed the ruling against Korea.  In 
my Saved DSU Scenario, the panel report would have been adopted as it was by 22 April 2018 
(i.e. within the mandated 60 days).  So, the result would have still been Korea losing, but that 
result would have occurred over a year earlier.  When the panel report went to the DSB in April 
2018, there would have been a debate as to whether the action by the Appellate Body to 
withhold substantive consideration of the appeal was proper.  After that debate, the DSB would 
have adopted the panel report under reverse consensus.  In order to refuse the adopt the panel 
report, the DSB would have needed a consensus and that would have been impossible to 
obtain.  
The next dispute to get to the DSB would have been the compliance panel in US 
- Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (DS 437).  This panel report was 
issued on 21 March 2018.  Although the panel rejected some claims by China, the panel found 
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that in several instances, the US government was still failing to comply with the WTO's rules on 
countervailing duties (CVDs).  In real life, the panel report was appealed by the US on 27 April 
2018.  Thereafter, on 15 August 2019, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report which upheld 
the panel report.  In my Saved DSU Scenario, the panel report would have been adopted by 21 
May 2018 with the exact same result that ensued over a year later in August 2019.  The cause 
of justice would have been better served with that more rapid timetable.  
When the CVD compliance panel report went to the DSB in spring 2018, a fiery debate would 
have ensued.  The US government would have harrumphed that its right to appeal was being 
denied by the Appellate Body in yet another example of how the Appellate Body oversteps its 
mandate.  Angrily, the US government would have argued that the DSB lacks authority to adopt 
the panel report.  Other governments would have responded that the reason why the Appellate 
Body was unable to adjudicate the appeal is because the US government, for over a year, had 
been illegally blocking the filling of vacant appellator seats.  Following that debate, the DSB 
would have acted by reverse consensus to adopt the panel report.  It would have been that 
easy! 
Thereafter, two more appealed cases would have come to the DSB.  First, the panel in the Japan 
v. Korea - Pneumatic Valves case (DS504) would have issued its report on 14 April 2018 finding 
antidumping violations by Korea.  In real life, the panel report was appealed, and then on 30 
September 2019, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report which made technical 
modifications to the panel report while reaching nearly the same conclusions.  In my Saved DSU 
Scenario, the panel report would have been adopted over a year earlier by 14 June 2018 with 
nearly the same result that ensued in September 2019.  Second, the panel in the Russia v. 
Ukraine - Ammonium Nitrate (DS 493) case would have issued its report on 29 May 2018 finding 
antidumping violations by Ukraine.  In real life, the panel report was appealed, and then on 30 
September 2019, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report which upheld the panel.  In my 
Saved DSU Scenario, the panel report would have been adopted over a year earlier by 29 July 
2018 with the same result that ensued over a year later in September 2019.  
Besides those four cases, no further cases appealed after 11 November 2017 have been 
completed so as to be eligible for adoption by the DSB. 
Since May 2018, 14 panel reports have been issued that were appealed.  For all these appeals, 
the appealing governments were on notice that their appeal was unlikely to be 
decided.  Nevertheless, these governments appealed anyway. In some instances, the appeals 
may have been bad faith appeals principally intended as a way to prevent the adoption of the 
panel reports.  (One of these 14 appeals has now been withdrawn).  In my Saved DSU Scenario, 
either these panel reports would not have been appealed or, if they were appealed, the appeal 
would have been dismissed.  Then all of these panel reports would have been adopted in the 
same customary manner as the four cases discussed above.  
I will not take the reader through all 14 cases.  But to highlight a few of them, the US 
appealed Super calendared Paper (DS 505) in 2018 after losing this CVD case; the US 
appealed Pipe and Tube (DS 523) in 2019 after losing this CVD case; Canada 
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appealed Differential Pricing Methodology (DS 534) in 2019 after the panel issued a narrow 
ruling against the US in an antidumping case; the US appealed Renewable Energy(DS 510) in 
2019 after losing this case under GATT.  At the DSB, the US would have objected to the 
adoption of Super calendared Paper, Pipe and Tube, and Renewable Energy, but those panel 
reports would nevertheless have been adopted months ago rather than remaining in limbo 
inside the Appellate Body.  The DSB debate on Differential Pricing Methodology would have 
been interesting because, on the merits, Canada had strong grounds to appeal.  But regardless 
of those legal merits, following the debate, the DSB would have adopted that panel 
report.  Another case that would have played out was Russia v. EU Energy Package (DS 476), a 
GATT and GATS case, in which the EU appealed in 2018 after the panel vindicated several of 
Russia's claims while ruling against other claims.  After the EU appealed, Russia also 
appealed.  In my Saved DSU Scenario, either the panel report would not have been appealed or, 
if it were appealed, the appeal would have been dismissed and then the panel report would 
have been adopted by the DSB in 2018.  
In summary, there are now 13 appealed cases at the Appellate Body which may never be 
adjudicated.  In my Saved DSU Scenario, 11 of these panel reports would have already been 
adopted -- six of them in 2018 and five of them in 2019.  Two of those 13 panel reports, against 
India and the EU, have been appealed within the past month and therefore would probably not 
yet have been brought to the DSB for adoption.  Given current circumstances, both the EU and 
India appeals are strategic, bad-faith appeals that warrant dismissal. 
In my Saved DSU Scenario, the DSB would have continued to be able to adopt all panel reports 
throughout 2018 and 2019.  No interruption of the predictability and security of the WTO panel 
process would have occurred.  Going forward from today, there would not have been any need 
to seek patches and workarounds because appeal would have been temporarily taken off the 
table by the Appellate Body in late 2017 until such time as the US allowed the DSB to refill the 
vacant seats on the Appellate Body.  The core part of WTO dispute settlement would have been 
saved.  The WTO would have enjoyed a soft landing rather than suffering a constitutional crisis.  
To be sure, the Saved DSU Scenario was unable directly to prevent the demise of the Appellate 
Body.  But that result is no different than what has eventuated in real life.  The Appellate Body 
itself could not be saved from the Trump Administration.  But the Appellate Body could have 
saved WTO dispute settlement from the Trump Administration.  
Had the Appellate Body followed my suggestion in December 2017, it could have focused its 
efforts on the six appeals that were in chambers at that time and issued decisions much 
sooner.  To wit, the appeal in EU - Aircraft (Art. 21.5) was lodged on 13 October 2016 (sic), but 
was not decided until 15 May 2018.  The appeal in US - Aircraft (Article 21.5) was lodged on 29 
June 2017, but was not decided by the Appellate Body until 28 March 2019.  The appeal in EU 
- PET was lodged on 30 August 2017, but was not decided until 10 May 2018.  The appeal in 
Brazil - Taxation was lodged on 28 September 2017, but was not decided until 13 December 
2018.  The appeal in Indonesia - Iron and Steel was lodged on 28 September 2017, but was not 
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decided until 15 August 2018.  The appeal in US - Tuna II (Second Recourse to Article 21.5) was 
lodged on 1 December 2017, but was not decided until 13 December 2018.  
In short, under my solution, by dismissing all new appeals after 11 December 2017, the 
Appellate Body could have moved closer to meeting its 60-day deadline through more rapid 
processing of its backlog of cases.  There would have been plenty of work for the Appellate 
Body to do through March 2019.  After March 2019, under my proposal, the three remaining 
appellators would have had a much lighter inbox.  In my view, sparing them the cases appealed 
after 11 December 2017 would have been more appropriate than piling on numerous new 
cases which the remaining appellators cannot possibly adjudicate in 60 days.  
Even with just the one appellator left today, some WTO governments will continue to 
appeal.  In fact, even a completely empty Appellate Body bench will not stanch the 
appeals.  That's why I posited in November 2017 that there needed to be a common sense 
connection between the percent of appellators available and the willingness of the Appellate 
Body to accept new appeals. My proposal, in effect, was that if less than 70 percent of the 
appellator seats were filled, then the Appellate Body should proclaim itself closed for new 
business until the missing judges were replaced. 
Having laid out this ceteris paribus Saved DSU Scenario, I want to point out that in my original 
Blog post in November 2017, I suggested that all other things would not be equal.  That is, 
rather than just a static scenario, there could have been a dynamic scenario leading to an even 
better WTO future.  The thought I expressed was that if the Appellate Body adopted my simple 
rescue plan and demonstrated to the Trump Administration that while the US could kill the 
Appellate Body, the US could not kill the automaticity of the adoption of WTO panel reports, 
there could have been a positive behavioral adjustment in the Trump Administration.  I said at 
the time, and I still believe, that if the Appellate Body had outwitted and outflanked the Trump 
Administration, the Administration would have backed down in blocking Appellate Body 
appointments.  The jig would have been up, so to speak.  
The Administration's purpose in emptying out the Appellate Body is not principally to prevent 
second level appellate review because as many commentators have noted, such review 
benefits the US as much as anyone. Rather, the Administration's purpose is to immunize the US 
from accountability in the WTO regarding the protectionist and nonmarket trade policies of the 
Trump Administration.  The US assault on the panel report adoption process also knocked the 
WTO off balance, thereby helping the Trump Administration thwart the WTO's legislative 
mission of opening markets and promoting the rule of law.  
Today, the Saved DSU Scenario looks pretty good compared to the status quo.  But my rescue 
plan could have enabled an even better future outcome.  I will call it the Dynamic Scenario.  In 
this scenario, after it was demonstrated to the US in May 2018 that panel reports would 
continue to be adopted in the future just as they had been in past via reverse consensus, the 
Trump Administration would have backed down and agreed to a deal to fill the vacant 
appellator seats.  The US might not have given this for free; some deal might have been 
required to respond to the US demands regarding the jurisprudence, customary practices, and 
 29 
staffing in the Appellate Body.  But if my plan had prevented the disruption of the adoptability 
of WTO panel reports, then the Trump Administration would have had far less negotiating 
leverage than it enjoys today to demand changes in the DSU to weaken the WTO compliance 
process. 
To be sure, I have no crystal ball.  My Dynamic Scenario regarding the Appellate Body may be 
too optimistic given the Trump Administration's concerns that the normativity of Appellate 
Body rulings against the US would make it marginally harder for the Administration to proceed 
willy nilly with more protectionist and unilateral trade measures.  But if so, then the fallback of 
the Saved DSU Scenario would be far superior to what world trading system will suffer through 
now.  
That's because the most fundamental advance in dispute settlement between the GATT and the 
WTO -- the automatic adoption of panel reports -- would have been preserved by my 
plan.  Now, it is lost.  Certainly, panel reports can still be adopted.  It's just that we've 
lost automatic adoption of cases with violations without the approval of the scofflaw 
defendant. 
Let me conclude with the biggest irony:  I have recently been informed by a WTO insider that 
the Appellate Body — which is so commonly and wrongfully accused of considering itself above 
the rules* — was unwilling to adopt my rescue plan because they believed it was against the 
rules.  
*See, for example, Alan Price, "Trump Administration Is Right: The WTO Is Broken," Law 360, 9 
December 2019. 
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